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STATEMENT OF INTERESTS OF AMICI1
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) is a nationwide, nonprofit, non-partisan organization with more than 500,000 members dedicated
to defending the principles of liberty and equality embodied in the
Constitution and the nation’s civil rights laws. The American Civil Liberties
Union of Virginia is one of its statewide affiliates. The ACLU and the
ACLU of Virginia have a long history of defending both the right to
privacy—including the right to reproductive freedom—and the right to
religious liberty. It is respectfully submitted that Amici’s analysis of the
questions raised by Plaintiffs’ Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim may
assist this Court in resolving this case.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2010, Congress passed and the President signed into law the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Affordable Care Act” or
“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010). By its terms, ACA aims to “regulate[] . . . economic and
financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when
1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), Amici have received consent from the parties to file
this brief. No party has written any part of this brief, and no person apart from Amici
contributed money to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. See Fed. R. App.
P. 29(c)(5).
1
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health insurance is purchased.” § 1501(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 133, 817. To
that end, beginning in 2014, ACA requires non-exempt individuals to
maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage or pay a penalty on
their tax returns. See id. § 1501(b). Likewise, ACA requires non-exempt
employers of more than fifty full-time employees to provide a minimum
level of health insurance coverage to their full-time employees or pay a civil
fine. See id. at § 1513(a), (d). In its current form, the law would extend
health care coverage to an estimated 32 million people, including more than
16 million women.
Plaintiffs contend, among other claims, that requiring them to comply
with the minimum coverage requirements would violate their rights under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1 (2006) because it would contravene their “sincerely held religious
beliefs against facilitating, subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting
abortions.” 2 (See J.A. 40 (alleging that ACA’s minimum coverage

2

Appellants also assert claims under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment, premised primarily on the fact that the statute limits religious
exemptions to (1) members of religious groups that provide health care for their
dependents and were formed before December 31, 1950, and (2) health care ministries
formed before December 31, 1999. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(d)(2)(A), (B). Those
claims are not addressed in this brief, however, because it appears, based on the record
below, that those claims are not properly before the Court. The individual plaintiffs do
not contend that they are members of a religious sect that provides for its dependents – a
requirement that has been upheld by the federal courts in the similar context of religious
exemptions from social security taxes. See, e.g., Droz v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue
2

Case: 10-2347

Document: 41-1

Date Filed: 02/25/2011

Page: 8

requirements will compel them to “choose between forced purchase of a
private insurance product that does not protect their sincerely held religious
beliefs or paying a punitive penalty for refusing to compromise their
religious beliefs”).) The District Court rejected their argument, reasoning
that, as a factual matter, “the [Affordable Care] Act contains strict
safeguards at multiple levels to prevent federal funds from being used to pay
for abortion services beyond those in cases of rape or incest, or where the
life of the woman would be endangered.”3 Liberty University, Inc. v.
Geithner, No. 10-15, 2010 WL 4860299, at *24 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010).
Serv., 48 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding identical religious exemption as
“narrowly drawn to maintain a fiscally sound Social Security system and to ensure that
all persons are provided for, either by the Social security system or by their church”);
Hatcher v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 688 F.2d 82, 84 (10th Cir. 1979) (same); Varga
v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1113, 1118-19 (D. Md. 1979) (rejecting plaintiff’s Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause challenge to membership requirement and holding
that plaintiff was properly denied exemption because “[u]nlike the Amish, the SeventhDay Adventist Church does not make reasonable provisions for its dependent members”).
Appellants thus appear to have no valid claim to the authorized exemption. Similarly,
neither the individual plaintiffs nor Liberty University contend that they are part of a
health care ministry. While the cut-off dates cited by Appellants may raise constitutional
concerns for individuals and groups who would otherwise qualify for the religious
exemptions, see generally Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), and should be closely
examined in any future case brought by such parties, they do not relieve Appellants here
of their obligation to comply with the insurance mandate.
3

As the District Court further explained, “at least one plan that does not cover nonexcepted abortion services,” abortions that are not necessary to save a woman’s life or
where the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest, “will be offered for enrollment through
each of the state health benefit exchanges, as required by the [Affordable Care] Act.”
Liberty University, Inc., 2010 WL 4860299, at *24. Moreover, even if a plan on the
exchange does cover non-excepted abortion services, “a separate payment for nonexcepted abortion services must be made by the policyholder to the insurer, and the
insurer must deposit those payments in a separate allocation account that consists solely
of those payments.” Id.
3
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On appeal, Plaintiffs expand their RFRA claim, arguing not only that they
object to subsidizing abortions, but also that they object to being required to
purchase an insurance plan that covers medical services – including
abortions – that Plaintiffs find objectionable.
Their argument is unavailing. Although Plaintiffs are correct that
RFRA requires a more demanding review of free exercise claims than does
the First Amendment under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
883-90 (1990), ACA nevertheless passes muster. The Court in Smith held
that neutral and generally applicable laws that impose incidental burdens on
religious practices do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Recognizing the
centrality of religious freedom to our democratic and constitutional ideals,
Congress enacted RFRA (with the support of various civil rights groups,
including Amici here) to restore the strict scrutiny standard that had served to
protect religious exercise prior to Smith. But even the pre-Smith test did not
sanction the sort of exemption from statutory programs that Plaintiffs seek in
this case. To the contrary, such claims were routinely rejected by the federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, even prior to Smith.
Plaintiffs’ claims should be similarly rejected. Plaintiffs have not
established that the mandate would substantially burden their religious
exercise, and they cannot distinguish ACA from other comprehensive

4
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statutory programs that have been upheld against free exercise challenge. In
arguing that they should nevertheless be exempt under RFRA, Plaintiffs seek
not merely a return to the pre-Smith strict scrutiny standard; they seek its
replacement with a bar so low that RFRA would effectively trump any law
that impinges, however slightly, on religious exercise or belief, provided that
the complainant could demonstrate a sincere objection. Turning RFRA into
a blanket religious exemption of this nature would threaten our most valued
health, welfare, and civil rights protections, and would ultimately engender
the very type of civic discord and sectarian strife that the Religion Clauses
were meant to prevent.4 Accordingly, the District Court’s dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs’ claim—teased out—is nothing short of an argument that
RFRA entitles them to pick and choose which medical procedures should be
covered for other paying patients under ACA. It is an argument wholly
4

See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
that the Religion Clauses seek “to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that
promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike”); id. at
709 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Government’s obligation to avoid divisiveness and
exclusion in the religious sphere is compelled by the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses.”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result) (recognizing that Religion Clauses aim “to reduce or eliminate religious
divisiveness or strife”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“What is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of
government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife
and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.”).
5
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unsupported by legal precedent that would transform RFRA from a shield
that protects against non-vital governmental acts that truly burden religious
exercise into a sword that could fell virtually any effort to enact
comprehensive legislation. Plaintiffs have not proved that ACA
requirements impose a substantial burden on their religious exercise, which
is a necessary predicate to invoking RFRA. Even if they had made this
showing, the Supreme Court has made clear that the government’s interest in
implementing its comprehensive health insurance program “free of ‘myriad
exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs’” justifies the
minimum coverage requirements. Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 260 (1982)).
A.

ACA Requirements Do Not Substantially Burden Plaintiffs’
Religious Practices.

First and foremost, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to show that complying
with the minimum coverage requirements would “substantially burden” their
religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a). Under RFRA, a “substantial
burden exists when government action puts ‘substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs[.]’” Kaemmerling
v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)); accord Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford
6
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County School Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that since
RFRA does not create a new test to determine what constitutes a “substantial
burden,” courts look to pre-Smith free exercise cases for that analysis). But
the fact that government action “is offensive to [an individual’s] religious
sensibilities” does not render the action a substantial burden. Navajo Nation
v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Plaintiffs here do not identify a cognizable substantial burden on their
religious exercise. They describe the alleged burdens on their religious
practice in this case as follows: Plaintiff Merrill “tr[ies] to ensure that her
funds are not co-mingled in a way that would advance abortion of any kind”
and that goal would allegedly be burdened by maintaining health insurance
that covered medical treatment to which she objects. (J.A. 20-21.) Plaintiff
Waddell’s religious exercise would allegedly be burdened by maintaining
health insurance that covered any unspecified “services to which she might
have a conscientious or religious objection.” (Id. at 19.) And Plaintiff
Liberty University (“Liberty”) would allegedly be burdened by providing its
employees with health insurance that included coverage for “services which
violate the University’s and its employees’ Christian values.” (Id. at 18-19.)
As a matter of law, none of these objections constitutes a substantial
burden under RFRA. Indeed, the federal courts have rejected similar claims

7
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premised upon the theory that a person’s religious exercise is burdened by
payment of a generally applicable tax or an insurance fee that might
facilitate another person’s access to medical procedures considered to be
sinful by the plaintiff.5 Goehring v. Brophy, for example, addressed a RFRA
claim nearly identical to Plaintiffs’ claim here. 94 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir.
1996), overruled on other grounds by City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).6 In that case, public university students objected to a
university’s requirement that they pay a registration fee on the ground that it
was used to subsidize the school’s health insurance program, which covered
abortion care. Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ RFRA and free exercise
claims, reasoning that the payments did not impose a substantial burden on
the plaintiffs’ religious exercise because “the plaintiffs [were] not required
to accept, participate in, or advocate in any manner for the provision of
abortion services.” Id. at 1300.
Similarly, in Tarsney v. O’Keefe, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of a free exercise challenge by taxpayers who objected on religious

5

Indeed, another court faced with a RFRA challenge to ACA recently found that the
minimum coverage requirements did not impose a substantial burden upon the plaintiffs’
religious practice under RFRA. See Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 WL 611139, at
*24 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
6

Goehring was decided before Boerne v. Flores, which held that RFRA does not apply
to state laws. Accordingly, the court in Goehring subjected the university’s rule to
RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard.
8
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grounds to the state’s use of their tax dollars to pay for Medicaid recipients’
medically necessary abortions. 225 F.3d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 2000). The
mere payment of taxes that may ultimately subsidize other individuals’
Medicaid abortion coverage, the court explained, was too remote an injury
even to accord standing upon the plaintiffs to assert a free exercise claim.7
Id. at 936; see also Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 678 (because the challenged
government action does not in any respect pressure the devout person to
“modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” there is no burden on their
religious practices) (quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Erzinger
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(“[T]he fact [that] plaintiffs may object on religious grounds to some of the
services the University provides is not a basis upon which plaintiffs can
claim a constitutional right not to pay a part of the fees.”); cf. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000) (holding that a
public university could require students to pay a student fee that funded a
forum for speech, despite students’ First Amendment claim that they should
not be required to subsidize the speech of student groups that they found
“offensive to their personal beliefs”).
7

As the court went on to explain in Tarsney, while under the Establishment Clause
“every taxpayer can claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support
of a religious institution,” a free exercise claim (and, by extension, a RFRA claim)
requires that the plaintiff’s own religious practice be burdened. Tarsney, 225 F.3d at 936
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
9
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Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal is misplaced. In Gonzales, the plaintiffs’ claim centered
on their asserted right to access a hallucinogen that was banned by the
Controlled Substances Act but was indispensable to their core religious
practices. 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006). The substantial and undisputed burden
on religious practice at issue in Gonzales is distinguishable from Plaintiffs’
objection at issue here. Most significant, the law in Gonzalez prevented the
plaintiffs from engaging in sacramental activities. In the case at hand, in
contrast, Plaintiffs cannot identify any comparable pressure to “modify
[their] behavior and to violate [their] beliefs.” Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at
678 (citation omitted). Rather, they can only assert an objection to
purchasing or subsidizing insurance coverage that would enable third parties
to obtain medical procedures to which they object. This is simply not
enough.
In short, Plaintiffs’ objections to the medical procedures that other
covered individuals may obtain with ACA-prescribed insurance do not give
rise to a cognizable RFRA claim—the requirements simply do not impose a
substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise within the meaning of
RFRA.

10
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Plaintiffs’ Claim For a Religious Exemption from ACA Is
Inconsistent With Well-Established Law.

Even assuming that RFRA applies, it does not entitle Plaintiffs to the
religious exemption they seek. The Supreme Court and other federal courts
have long rejected claims seeking exemptions from, or invalidation of,
comprehensive and broadly applicable statutory programs like ACA’s
minimum coverage requirements.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim.8
Like Plaintiffs here, the Amish taxpayer in Lee objected to participating in
the Social Security system on religious grounds.9 The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected that free exercise claim, explaining:
[I]t would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive
social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a
wide variety of religious beliefs . . . . There is no principled way
. . . to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed
under the Social Security Act. If, for example, a religious
adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the
8

Although the Court in Lee found that the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs in that case were
burdened, there is no similar burden here. The plaintiffs in Lee objected to both paying
and receiving Social Security benefits because their religion compelled them to take care
of their own elderly population. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs object to the use of their tax
or premium dollars to support another, third party’s medical care. An objection to
medical procedures obtained by third parties simply does not substantially burden
Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.
9

While Lee was decided pre-RFRA and pre-Smith, its strict scrutiny analysis applies to
Appellants’ RFRA claim, since RFRA was meant to restore the pre-Smith free exercise
standard. See Goodall, 60 F.3d at 171; Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d
173, 179 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[W]e cannot help but be guided by [the] reasoning [of Lee and
Hernandez] in determining whether the least restrictive means have been employed to
further the government’s compelling interest [under RFRA].”).
11
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federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related
activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim
to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax.
The tax system could not function if denominations were
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were
spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.
Id. at 259-60 (citations omitted). Emphasizing that “mandatory participation
is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system,” the Court
concluded that the burden placed on the plaintiff was justified by the interest
in uniform administration of the system free of piecemeal exceptions for
religious objectors. Id. at 258-59 (explaining that “[r]eligious beliefs can be
accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would radically
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature”) (quotation marks and
citations omitted); accord Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700.
Furthermore, as this Court has made clear, Lee’s holding extends
beyond the Social Security context to similarly “comprehensive statute[s]”
for which there is no “principled way” to accommodate myriad
individualized religious objections without undermining the interests
underlying the governmental program at issue. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the Fair Labor
Standards Act to a sectarian school because exempting the school would
“undermine the congressional goal of making minimum wage and equal pay
requirements applicable to private as well as public schools”); see South
12
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Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Com’n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203, 1207-08
(6th Cir. 1990) (applying Lee’s analysis to a workers’ compensation statute).
In this case, ACA’s minimum coverage requirement is
indistinguishable from those other programs upheld by this Court and the
Supreme Court. Under Lee and its progeny, Plaintiffs are not entitled to an
exemption from ACA’s minimum coverage requirements, nor are they
entitled to invalidation of the statute.
Plaintiffs’ contentions on appeal only reinforce this point. Although
their pleadings do not specify a religious objections to any covered medical
procedures apart from abortion, Plaintiffs fault the District Court for
focusing exclusively on the issue of abortion, noting their objection to
additional, unspecified “medical procedures . . . antithetical to their religious
beliefs.” (App. Br. at 48.) But as the Supreme Court stated in an analogous
context, “[t]his argument knows no limitation.” Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 700.
In a “cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable
religious preference,” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961),
innumerable medical procedures will be disfavored by adherents of one
religion or another.
For example, individuals whose faith proscribes sexual relations
outside of marriage may object to health insurance coverage of erectile

13
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dysfunction medication for unmarried men. Individuals who believe that
contraception or sterilization is sinful may object to coverage for such care.10
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who “believe that the Bible prohibits blood
transfusions,” Klassy v. Physicians Plus Ins. Co., 371 F.3d 952, 954 (7th Cir.
2004), may object to coverage of blood transfusion procedures. These are,
of course, sincere religious beliefs, and under no circumstances should
individuals with such objections be forced to undergo medical treatments
proscribed by their faith. But ACA does not require these individuals – or
Plaintiffs – to undergo treatment that conflicts with their religious views.
Exempting every person whose religious beliefs disfavor a medical
procedure that a third party might conceivably obtain with ACA-prescribed
health insurance would undermine the very comprehensive health insurance
coverage that Congress deemed “essential” to the operation of ACA. Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2)(G). RFRA does not require such a result. See,
e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 258; Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1301; Dole, 899 F.2d at

10

See Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 461 (N.Y.
2006) (rejecting religiously based objection to state law requiring that certain insurance
contracts provide coverage for prescription contraceptives); Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73 (Cal. 2004) (same); Letter from
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., General Counsel, U. S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, to
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Sept. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.usccb.org/ogc/preventive.pdf (objecting to coverage for prescription
contraception and sterilization in ACA).
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1398; accord Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 WL 611139, at *24-25
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (upholding ACA against a RFRA challenge).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the dismissal of
Appellants’ RFRA claims.
Respectfully submitted,

s/ Andrew D. Beck
Andrew D. Beck
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American Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
212-549-2633
Daniel Mach
Heather L. Weaver
American Civil Liberties Union
915 15th Street, 6th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
202-544-1681
Rebecca Glenberg
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February 25, 2011

15

Case: 10-2347

Document: 41-1

Date Filed: 02/25/2011

Page: 21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C), I hereby certify that:
1.

The Amici Curiae Brief complies with the type-volume

limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C) because it contains 4,608 words,
counted by Microsoft Word, excluding the parts of the Brief exempted by
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C)(iii).
2.

This Brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R.

App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6)
because its has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
Microsoft Word 97-2003 in Times New Roman, 14-point font.

s/ Andrew D. Beck
Andrew D. Beck
Attorney for Amici Curiae
February 25, 2011

Case: 10-2347

Document: 41-1

Date Filed: 02/25/2011

Page: 22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on February 25, 2011, the foregoing document was served on
all counsel of record through the CM/ECF system.

s/ Rebecca Glenberg
Rebecca Glenberg
VSB No. 44099
Attorney for Amici Curiae

